The unambiguous “red” thread (both of Ariadne and Marx) that runs through Zizek’s work is the attempt to rescue universalism from naysayers of all sorts. A major core of this project are his discussions of the importance of the Cartesian subject. At one point, (I can’t remember where) he chastises Adorno and Horkheimer for not being historical enough in their denunciation of Descartes, in their claims that the Cartesian subject is the root of instrumental rationality and the destructive tendencies of modernism. Ellen Wood’s brief treatment of modernity and enlightenment in The Origin of Capitalism is highly enlightening on this point, providing an historical account that separates the universalism of the Enlightenment as it appeared in feudal France from the ideology of improvement that accompanied modern thinking in capitalist England. That is, she attempts to show that some of the core values – notably the progressive values of modernism – are in fact the product of a non-capitalist system, and suggests (she makes a point of making it clear that she does not consider her discussion a fully fledged argument) that the root of instrumental rationality is more likely to be traced to the philosophies produced under a capitalist one.

One of the first divisions that need be pointed out is that ‘bourgeois’ does not (or at least did not) refer to capitalists, but city dwellers. “Bourgeois” in absolutist France, for instance, were professionals, office holders and intellectuals (184). This means that something like the French Revolution, which is held up to be one of the culminating points of the Enlightenment, was not a revolution of a capitalist class over aristocrats but of professionals, etc. who wanted access to the offices of the absolutist state in order to make their fortunes. It is here, of course, that we find the discussion of universal suffrage and the rights of man at the centre of political discourse.

Wood points out that many of the biggest know Enlightenment thinkers in France were aristocrats, not capitalists, while in England they were closely linked to capitalist expansion. In France, she argues, one finds Cartesian rationalism and rational planning, in England one finds empiricism (think Hume) and Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” – i.e. the anarchy of the Market. In France, the ideology of universal human emancipation; in England the ideology of ‘improvement’ (i.e. making land profitable). She points to the French “Gardens of Versailles” and English “natural” landscape gardening as the cultural expression of these two versions of modernity.

A formal French garnden

A formal French garnden

An English landscape Garden

An English landscape Garden

While she acknowledges that there were overlaps and cross pollinations, Wood wants to show that the above were the dominant trends and that they accompanied very different economic logics. In this way she seeks to show that the emancipatory legacy of universalism as it appeared in France is worth keeping and shouldn’t be conflated with ‘capitalist logic’ or capitalist ideologies.

It’s worthwhile to note that the classic (Leninist) trivium runs English pragmatism, French politics, German Philosophy: it was Kant who synthesized the rationalism of Descartes and the “radical empiricism” of Hume; it was Hegel (according to Zizek) who was more Kantian than Kant, thereby completing the Kantian project; it was Marx who made Hegel walk on his feet and synthesized English political economy, French political thought (think The Eighteenth Brumaire of L.B., etc.) and German philosophy. Given the argument that Wood presents, the question that must be asked is in regards to the economic situation in Germany – i.e. what was it? That I can’t answer, but I suspect its beginnings can be found in a paper by one of Woods students, George Comninel, in his “Marx’s Context” (History of Political Thought, 21:3, 2000)

From Marx’s introduction to the critique of Hegel’s philosophy of law:

…the German conception of the modern state, which abstracts from real man, was only possible because and in so far as the modern state itself abstracts from real man or satisfies the whole man in a purely imaginary way. The Germans have thought in politics what other nations have done. Germany has been their theoretical conscience. The abstraction and arrogance of Germany’s thought always kept pace wit the one-sided and stunted character of their reality. So if the status quo of the German political system is an expression of the consummation of the ancien régime, the completion of the thorn in the flesh of the modern state, then the status quo of German political thought is an expression of the imperfection of the modern state, the damaged condition of the flesh itself (Early Writings, 250-1).

The broken body made whole in the imaginary; Germany as superego; and the constitutional monarch as Jesus FTW!


God the Postulate

March 13, 2009

Okay, so I looked at the paper that I wrote for Vernon the other day and can now report back on the 2 forms of freedom that Kant talks about. The first is negative freedom. This freedom is attached to the letter-writing example, i.e. even if you do write a letter to condemn someone to save your own life, you very well could not right that letter. That is, you could go against your natural inclination to save your skin and refuse to right the letter. This is freedom from the noumenal as the realm of causality. The second, positive,freedom is the positing of a universal maxim – i.e. the ability to come up with a moral law that (attempts to) conform to the categorical imperative. Positively defined freedom is the ability of any rational will “to determine their causality by the representation of rules” and to act upon them (CoPrR, 29).

So, as SB was saying, this second freedom is probably linked to the supposed freedom of one who has acted. I.e. at some point there must have been a ‘primal choice’ made which can be read into your present actions.

Another thing I found that I had forgotten about is that Kant talks about Freedom as an historical development, and he starts with the Greeks – more specifically, the stoics. Kant argues that the stoics were able to conceive of freedom, but they did so without being able to include happiness (read: pleasure). So, the stoics had to be free but not happy, and held themselves to be divinities beyond contentment. It’s Kant’s contention that the question of pleasure is only able to come into contact with the question of freedom with the advent of Christianity – i.e. the ability to posit a noumenal cause for the world in place of us (i.e. God) as well as an infinite soul and heaven. The Lacanian overtones here are clear: God, the soul and heaven are postulates (and not fundamental concepts) that support the will to be ethical (i.e. the freedom of positing a universal moral law) and enable us to both be ethical and have pleasure (read: enjoyment).

Here’s the summary I wrote in my paper:

There is in the end one categorical imperative and three postulates: immortality, freedom and God. The postulate of freedom is the necessary supposition of independence from the sensible world (negative freedom) as well as the capacity to determine the will through the moral law (positive freedom) (Kant, 110). The will and the moral law consequently imply each other. The postulates of God and the immortal soul are also necessary: Kant defines a postulate as “attached inseparably to an a priori unconditionally valid practical law“, and so those of God and the immortal soul cannot be left aside (Kant, 102).

I wish I could remember Hegel’s critique of this, but instead I’ll say this: It seems to me that the end of analysis would look like a dialectical return to the stoics – i.e. we don’t need a God/Other; the divine is returned to the human (Christ); we are then free to ‘not enjoy’…